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Over 94 million Americans live in coastal counties. 1 Despite the coast’s scenic views and
salty charm, more and more people are fleeing the coast as the sea engulfs their property and the
cost of maintaining their ocean-view homes becomes too high.2 Those who can afford to escape
rising sea levels and the accompanying floods flock to high ground, pushing out those who can no
longer afford to stay. This is known as “climate gentrification,” where those escaping the sea are
gentrifying areas inland and causing displacement of long-term residents, usually minorities or
members of impoverished communities.3
This note will discuss three types of policies commonly implemented to combat climate
change and rising sea levels – protection, accommodation, and retreat policies – and will explore
how they contribute to climate gentrification. It will offer solutions to balance the influx of people
inland. The concept of climate gentrification has been studied in Miami and the surrounding area. 4
This note, however, will focus on climate gentrification as a national phenomenon, and use general
policy proposals to portray how those policies effect this concept.
Part II of this note gives a brief history of climate change and sea level rise, introduces
climate gentrification, and how the two are related; it also introduces the governmental policies
and regulations applied to combat climate change. Part III explores the three types of climate
change mitigation policies, how well they work to protect property owners on the sea, and how
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those policies could affect gentrification. Part IV proposes a solution that keeps the interests of
both the coastal property owners and mainland dwellers in mind. This note only aims to introduce
the legal implications of the recently-introduced idea of “climate gentrification,” how to best
combat those effects to prevent displacement, and how property owners on both the coasts and dry
land can take note of what can happen in the near future as the law adapts to climate change.
Gentrification arguments, for or against, are beyond the scope of this article.

PART II
CLIMATE CHANGE
Hurricane Michael in 2018, equipped with “unprecedented strength,” took 16 lives,
destroyed hundreds of homes, erased utilities for weeks, and brought with it a toxic algae bloom
in the Florida Panhandle.5 Michael was the first Category 4 hurricane to hit the Panhandle region,
one of only four hurricanes to hit the Panhandle in the last 50 years, and the strongest hurricane to
hit the continental U.S. in over 20 years. 6 Hurricane Harvey in 2017 was nearly as destructive, if
not more than Michael, accompanied by orders of evacuation and a path of destruction still being
repaired to this day.7 Hurricanes Sandy in 2012, notorious Katrina in 2005, and Irma in 2017 also
share the honor as some of the deadliest and costliest hurricanes to hit the United States. 8 While
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shocking and disturbing, these superstorms are becoming more of an expected pattern each year. 9
Climate change researchers are watching the potential for hurricane numbers, duration, and
strength rise.10 Sea surface temperature, a power source for hurricanes, is rising each year and it
has been suggested that the increase in this temperature is likely correlated with the rising
destructive superstorm activity. 11
Scientists attribute these monster hurricanes to the worsening effects of a rising global
temperature.12 Hurricane Michael’s dump of a toxic algae bloom deposited a dangerous red tide
phenomena which is occurring more frequently each year.13 Toxic algae kills massive amounts of
marine life and causes respiratory illnesses in humans.14 Flooding is also a cause for concern,
where storm-surges often threaten life and property as a result of additional water being pulled
onto the mainland. 15 Flooding events are turning more catastrophic; by 2080, 100-year flood
events are expected to change to 30-year flood events, and it has even been suggested this turn
may come before 2080.16 Flooding from Hurricane Sandy reached levels that occur roughly every
1000 years, but by the end of this century could occur every 20. 17
Perhaps the most concerning effect, at least for purposes of this note, is the rising sea level.
The sea level has risen about seven inches over the past century due to ocean expansion from
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warmer temperatures, glacier melt, and ice sheet melt.18 Three of the nine highest recorded water
levels in the NY Harbor region have occurred since 2010 and eight of the largest twenty have
occurred since 1990. 19 As the sea level rises, coastal storms will push the sea to levels and areas
it has rarely or never been in human memory, creating record high flood levels more and more
frequently along the coast. 20 The rising sea level not only floods its surroundings: it erodes
shorelines and displaces entire coastal communities.21 This leaves vulnerable the 94 million
people who reside in coastal property in the U.S. 22

CLIMATE GENTRIFICATION
Jesse Keenan, a Harvard scholar who studies residential patterns in Miami and other coastal
regions predicts that climate change will greatly influence the residential market in areas of high
elevation.23 He has coined the term “Climate Gentrification” to denote middle-to-upper-income
residents leaving Miami Beach and other like-places with nuisance flooding for higher elevation,
which in turn raises the price of property in those areas.24
Based on his study, there are two ways in which people can be displaced around the coastal
regions.25 First, as population moves from coastal areas to inland urban areas, those without means
can be displaced from the urban areas because the property becomes unaffordable by virtue of its
resiliency.26 Keenan found the rate of appreciation of a single-family property in Miami Dade
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County to be positively related to and correlated with incremental measures of higher elevation,
thus hypothesizing that the cost of living will drastically rise as households will gradually move
from the coastal barrier islands to the mainland. 27
The second hypothesizes that as it becomes increasingly expensive to maintain coastal
property, those without means living along the coast will be displaced because it becomes
unaffordable to keep up with repairs and insurance. 28

He states that the deterioration of

environmental conditions will cause a shift in the overall cost of living, which will only be feasibly
borne by wealthier and wealthier households as time goes on.29 Gentrification, in this example he
says, would occur inversely by the fact that vulnerable populations are unable to afford to live
along the coast due to the property taxes, insurance, repairs, to even the loss of productivity due to
sitting in traffic in water-logged streets.30
Since the 1960s, policymakers began to seriously consider an appropriate response to
climate change.31 These plans have focused on safety, the neighborhoods, buildings, structures,
and most importantly, the residents.32 In 2008, federal and state officials urged Congress that the
threat to coastal regions was irreversible and states should receive assistance from the federal
government to facilitate proper solutions to cope with rising sea levels. 33 Generally speaking, there
are three policy responses that local governments enact to minimize the hazards of climate
change.34 The policy solutions are to accommodate climate change threats through insurance or
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building codes, to protect property with physical barriers, or to retreat from the coast.35 Keenan’s
conclusion is that land use regulators will be tasked with evaluating the consequences of relocation
and densification, particularly in higher-elevations.36 He theorizes that to mitigate the influx in
population and the accompanying chance of gentrification, municipalities should begin an inquiry
into inclusionary zoning, the creation of affordable housing by governmental mandate.37

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
Accommodation policies attempt to minimize the damage to buildings from flooding,
storm surges, and hurricanes.38 These policies aim to decrease the damage to structures caused by
flooding and storms through costly insurance policies, minimum floor elevations on newly
constructed buildings, structural bracing, or building codes that comport with flood insurance
policies.39 These policies do exactly as their name suggests, allowing for continuous climate
change abuse without trying to prevent the damage or mitigate the future risk. Protection policies
defend property against the threat of sea level rise, storm surges, and floods usually through sturdy
structures like levees or barriers like dunes.40 Retreat policies aim to minimize the hazards of sea
level rise by prohibiting or removing development from areas vulnerable to flooding. 41

These

policies will be analyzed in conjunction with Keenan’s proposed solution of inclusionary zoning
to understand the implication they may pose on the law. Because private property is affected in
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each of these types of policies, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will be implicated and
possibly act as an impediment to the success of these policies.42 Furthermore, because of the
complexity of these policies and the legal challenges they convey, lawmakers may end up wasting
time on the hurdles they present rather than finding solutions for those on the mainland who are at
risk of displacement.
PART III
ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE
TAKINGS CHALLENGES
Local governments and the federal government can regulate private property, through
traditional police power, for “public use,” which the courts have interpreted to mean promoting
public health, safety, welfare, or morals.43 Sometimes a regulation destroys value in a way deemed
to be a taking.44 Other times, takings can occur directly through the power of eminent domain. In
addition to this “public use” requirement, the government’s power to take private property is also
limited by the Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation” requirement.45

Compensation is

determined by the judiciary, ensuring that the property owner would be put in the same position
monetarily as he would be if his property had not been taken.46 The Supreme Court has frequently
held that the market value of property at the time of the taking is the best measure for
compensation.47
Land use regulations put in place to protect landowners from climate change will inevitably
restrict private property development and will be subject to takings challenges.48 Governments

42

Applegate, supra note 33, at 512.
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will also have to build barriers on private property, by taking an easement through eminent domain,
also subjecting these acts to takings challenges. 49 However, Takings Clause jurisprudence “lacks
both uniformity and clarity,” and judges will have to answer to landowners’ takings challenges as
a result of climate change policies, ultimately becoming “chaotic.”50

INCLUSIONARY ZONING
Kennan’s solution, inclusionary zoning, refers to a scheme that “requires developers to
mitigate the adverse effects of non-residential development upon the shortage of housing either
indirectly, by contributing to an affordable-housing trust fund, or directly, by actually constructing
affordable housing.”51 For example, the ordinance at issue in Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Holmdel
allowed the developer to either build below density requirements or to contribute to a trust fund
for a percentage of the purchase price of the new units.52 The trust fund was used for the direct
benefit to the production of lower income units in a given project.53 Other examples of ordinances
typically allow the developer to allot a percentage of new units for lower income families or
contribute to a similar trust fund. 54
The developers in Holmdel challenged the inclusionary ordinance, claiming the ordinance
was an unconstitutional grant of statutory power and that it constituted a taking of property. 55 The
Holdmel Court in previous years had decided S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Mt.
Laurel II), which had imposed an affirmative obligation on every municipality in New Jersey to

49

Infra notes 75-85.
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provide affordable housing. 56 In Holmdel, the court held that the inclusionary ordinance at issue
served the purpose of providing affordable housing within a region and bore a real and substantial
relationship to the regulation of land use, thereby following the Mt. Laurel II decision.57 The court
held there was no unconstitutional grant of statutory power because through the Mt. Laurel II
decision and New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, each municipality had the power to enact ordinances
to further affordable housing goals. 58 “The fact that defendants seek to accomplish the generalwelfare goal of affordable housing by development fees rather than by mandatory set-asides does
not negate a ‘real and substantial relationship’ of such development fees to the regulation of
land.”59 As for the takings claim, the court held that as long as the ordinances were “not
confiscatory and [did] not result in an inadequate return of investment,” there was no injury.60
Inclusionary zoning in theory then, takes into account the finite supply of land and ensures
the opportunity and means to provide affordable housing.61 Inclusionary zoning has not proven to
be as effective in practice, however. The Florida Legislature enacted the Growth Management
Act (GMA), which required municipalities to take housing supply and affordability into account. 62
Despite its intentions, the authors of the GMA admit it has resulted in more “aspirational goalsetting as opposed to realistic planning.” 63

The goals, policies, and objectives have gone

unrealized and have not been fully implemented due to a community that expresses a desire for
affordable housing, establishes a comprehensive plan to achieve the goal, but then promulgates
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development regulations that cap permissible development at a density far less than the density
required to achieve the plan’s goals.64
Furthermore, inclusionary zoning has been criticized for imposing “significant burdens on
those who wish to develop their property.” 65 Governments vying to build new housing for lowincome families do so assuming that housing needs must primarily be met with new housing. 66
However, most low-to-moderate-income housing has always been provided through “filtering,” a
process by which the wealthy move into brand new homes, the moderate-income population take
up older homes, and the low-income population rent or own outdated housing.67 Revenues raised
from taxing new construction could instead be spent by an inclusionary government program to
assist

low-income

families

in

purchasing

existing

housing

units.68

All of this to say that perhaps Keenan’s suggestion of implementing more inclusionary
zoning policies is not the best solution to limit displacement caused by climate gentrification. As
discussed below, each policy proposed to assist in climate change mitigation also presents its own
legal challenges.69 The best solution then, is to tie the inclusionary zoning into the climate change
policies to introduce a new idea of transferable development rights (TDRs), which will be
discussed in Part IV.70

64

Id. (No Florida statutes could be found nor case law discussing the success or failure or legality of inclusionary
ordinances in Florida).
65
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188, 194 (2001).
66
Ellickson, Robert C., The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (1981).
67
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69
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PROTECTION POLICIES
Protection policies focus on defending individual buildings and sites from flooding and
shore erosion in order to combat climate change effects.71 These include building dunes, levees,
floodwalls, tidal barriers or barrier islands. 72 Local governments, and the federal government even,
can take an easement from private property through eminent domain in order to build protectionist
measures, discussed here.73 The government may also take the entirety of a private property
through eminent domain, discussed below as a form of retreat.74
Determining “just compensation” for eminent domain purposes for a coastal property is
confusing and presents an obstacle to effectively implementing protection policies. Consider a
protective dune or wall on someone’s private property built by the government to save the property.
How much economic value and practical use did the government usurp by stripping a family of 30
feet of beach access, or 22 feet of beach visibility? Was it possible the government added value
to the home by doing so, considering this protective dune will add at least 50 years of life to the
property?
This issue of just compensation arose in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan. 75 The
Borough condemned a portion of the Karan’s property to replace an existing smaller dune with a
larger dune.76 The new dune was part of a larger shore-protection project designed to protect all
residents of the Borough from “the destructive fury of the ocean,” but it resulted in the Karans
losing part of their view of the beach.77 The Karans were entitled to just compensation under the

71

Applegate, supra note 33, at 515.
Id.
73
Joshua Ulan Galperin, Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Horne's Compensation Analysis with an Eye to
Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 (2016).
74
See infra, notes 121-129.
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214 N.J. 384 (2013).
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Id. at 392.
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New Jersey and United States Constitutions, but the question was how to properly calculate a
compensation when the Karans’ property value was both lessened and enhanced by the dune. 78
Just compensation should be based on benefits that are “capable of reasonable calculation
at the time of the taking.”79 Speculative benefits should not be considered in a just compensation
analysis.80 Benefits that both sellers and buyers agree enhance the value of the property, however,
should be considered in the determination.81 The court failed to define both of these terms. 82 The
Borough argued that the Karans newfound longevity and ability to stay on their property greatly
increased the value of the home, while adding that the Karans’ tax contribution was infinitesimal
– and the court agreed and remanded the case for the jury to determine what the value of the
protection was.83 The court declared the fair market value of the property to be the standard in just
compensation cases, but this value is ultimately a question for the jury to determine. 84
Subsequently, the Karans and the Borough settled for $1.85
This uncertainty in value could disadvantage littoral property owners because their
expectations for the price of their property would be determined by finicky jury members. The
before and after market approach likely results in little compensation, just like in Harvey Cedars,
as the government will argue the 30 years of protection from the dune, albeit a taking, is priceless.
It is likely there will be an influx of compensation challenges in the near future if governments

78

Id. at 388.
Id. at 412-13.
80
Id. at 413.
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Id.
82
Id.
83
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turn to protectionist measures and take from private property in order to do the protecting. 86
However, these protectionist policies are only delaying the inevitable, because eventually the water
will become impossible to hold back. Littoral property owners will eventually have to move from
their coastal homes, leaving the problem of displacement to repeat itself.

RETREAT POLICIES
Retreating policies attempt to reduce the hazards created by sea level rise by restricting,
prohibiting, or removing development and housing altogether from areas at risk of being destroyed
by flooding.87 These policies force populations out of their homes through either the acquisition
of the entire property by eminent domain, or by prohibiting land development with land use
regulations.88 Retreating is generally deemed impossible by local governments because it is
“politically unpopular and expensive,” especially when done through the purchase of already
developed properties by eminent domain.89 Although unpopular, retreating has slowly crept into
city planning in urban and rural areas through zoning ordinances, and these ordinances are
considered the more proactive approach of climate change policies that prevent flood disasters. 90
While some people retreat without government intervention due to high costs of
maintaining their coastal property, or become disillusioned by competing with the sea, most retreat

86

See infra, pp. 22-23.
Applegate, supra note 33, at 515.
88
Land use regulation is controlled primarily through zoning ordinances to control and direct the development of
property. Zoning controls the height, use, bulk, and density of buildings. Use zones typically control if the building
will be used for industry, residence, or other purposes. Height zones control limits and maximums for airspace and
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population limits on the lot, by controlling how many people can occupy the space based on square feet. Cities
should deny zoning ordinances which request “up-zoning,” or increasing allowable uses or developments on land
near water, because these areas are at risk for flooding. “Down-zoning,” or reducing the number of allowable uses,
is more appropriate for at-risk areas in recognition of the city’s police power. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER,
ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 65 (4th ed. 2018).
89
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occurs from direct land use regulation enacted to encourage retreat. 91 Typical regulations to ward
off the rising sea level would be a prohibition against residential use, or setting parcel bulk
restrictions, or possibly prohibiting any further development on the property. 92 By declining
further development or residential use, the city would be exercising its police powers to protect
public health, safety, and welfare, and change with the needs of the time. 93 Zoning regulations are
generally held valid in recognition of those police powers.94
Retreat policies may be challenged as a regulatory taking if the zoning regulations impact
the property so severely that the value of the land diminishes due to an inability to use the land. In
such a case, the government will have to answer to a regulatory takings challenge and might have
to pay just compensation if it is found to be a taking.95 Regulatory takings are not to be confused
with eminent domain. The difference is that the government explicitly takes property by eminent
domain for a specific public purpose. 96 In contrast, with regulatory takings, the government is
regulating land use but does so to the point the owner has lost all beneficial use of the property.97
A regulation is not a taking if it destroys the utility of one portion of the land, as long as the entire
land as a whole remains valuable. 98
In a seminal regulatory takings challenge, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a
landowner paid nearly one million dollars for two residential lots on an island that was
subsequently regulated by the municipality to ban any permanent habitability structures from being
built.99 Lucas contended the ban was an unconstitutional regulatory taking, even though the

91

Kaswan, Climate Change Adaptation And Land Use: Exploring The Federal Role, supra note 35, at 516.
Juergensmeyer, supra note 88.
93
Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 299-300 (1944).
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government did not take the land for its own use, but because it had prevented Lucas from using
the land in its entirety. 100 South Carolina insisted the regulation was put into place to protect the
land from harmful and noxious uses, which the Court had seemingly always allowed a government
to do within its police powers. 101 South Carolina argued that Lucas’s development would be a
nuisance in that the construction would contribute to the erosion of the island and further a public
harm.102 The Supreme Court held that no matter the regulation, if a regulation deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, the government may resist compensation only if the inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed uses were not part of the title to begin
with.103 That is, if the state can prove a valid nuisance ordinance or purpose that existed before
the regulation prohibiting development, it will likely succeed. 104
The court used examples to describe regulatory takings that would not entitle a landowner
to just compensation. 105 An owner of a lakebed denied a permit to participate in a landfill operation
would not be entitled to compensation if the effect would flood others’ land.106 The owner of a
nuclear generating plant would not be entitled to compensation if after the plant was discovered to
sit on an earthquake fault, he was required to remove all improvements from the land. 107 Both of
these regulations eliminate all economic productive use for the landowners, however, the use of
these properties for the now prohibited purposes was already always unlawful, the regulations did
not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under existing nuisance
principles.108

100

Id.
Id.
102
Lucas, 505 US at 1022
103
Id. at 1010.
104
Id.
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Id. at 1029.
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Id.
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The inquiry into nuisances entails an analysis of the degree of harm to public lands and
resources; degree of harm to adjacent private properties; the social value of the claimant’s activities
and their suitability to the locality in question; and the relative ease with which the alleged harm
can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and government alike. 109 The court
remanded Lucas, and stated that in order for South Carolina to succeed, it must identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Lucas intended in the
circumstances in which the property was presently found.110 “Only on this showing can the State
fairly claim that, in proscribing such beneficial uses, the [land use regulation] is taking nothing.”111
Lucas may be one of few land-owner-friendly regulation cases. The question here is if
regulations were enacted to protect the landowner against harmful or dangerous property, would
they too be struck down?112 If a regulation prevented a landowner from building not to protect the
land as a historical site or open space, but to prevent the landowner from any physical or financial
harm due to impending floods or storms, would that regulation be upheld to protect against an

109

Id. at 1030-32
Id. at 1031.
111
Id. at 1032.
112
Additionally, if these regulations did protect the landowner from the dangers of flooding, but did not strip the
land of all economic value, how would the courts rule? It is likely the courts would reject these claims brought by a
landowner. For example, in Maine, a regulation restricted permits for a limited time to harvest timber on certain
woodlands for the purpose of protecting wildlife. A harvesting company brought suit, claiming the regulation
constituted a taking as it rendered the land “useless” and was an unreasonable exercise of Maine’s police power in
violation of due process. The court rejected these claims. The harvesting company asserted that the value of the
land as timberland has been destroyed, hence the value of the land for any purposes was zero; however, the court in
rejecting that assertion stated there were other purposes for the land besides harvesting timber. The court held there
is no place for expectations of future profits except to the extent those expectations are reflected in present market
value, and because the harvesting restriction was only temporary, the land wasn’t technically useless. As for the
due process claim, the court stated the requirements of due process in the exercise of police powers separated into
three elements: (1) the object of the exercise must be to provide for the public welfare; (2) the legislative means
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existing nuisance? Or would it be struck down as in Lucas as stripping the landowner of the value
of his property?
Courts have rejected many Fifth Amendment challenges to flood plain ordinances. 113
Courts have only held regulations pertaining to flood plain zoning invalid in a few of the more
than 125 appellate state and federal cases addressing floodplain regulations over the last decade,
including those that challenge the regulation as a taking of private property.114 In Beverly Bank v.
Illinois Department of Transportation, the court held that the Illinois legislature had the authority
to prohibit the construction of new residences in the 100-year floodway and that a taking claim
was premature.115 In State of Wisconsin v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment, the court held
that variance for a replacement of fishing cottage in the floodway of a river was barred by a valid
zoning ordinance.116 A court rejected a claim that the rezoning of a 150 acre golf course from
residential to strictly recreational use was a taking because the property was important for flood
water storage.117 Land use law and flood ordinance jurisprudence suggests that the prevention of
risky flood plain development, even if partially done for parental reasons, is a valid police power
objective and would not withstand a takings challenge.118
As sea level rises, regulatory takings challenges will likely increase as local governments
strive to find the best solution to protect their citizens.119 However, because the courts have
routinely held that restricted zoning to protect citizens, or wildlife, or for preservation purposes all
fall within a city’s police powers, it is likely that restricting coastal living will be deemed lawful
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and appropriate in order to further a city’s safety scheme. 120 Retreat policies, while constitutional
and focus on keeping the population safe, only exacerbate the effects of climate gentrification.
People would be forced out of their homes and obliged to find homes on the mainland, rushing
displacement and not allowing time for any solutions to form.
As for retreat policies that would take an entire property through eminent domain, the
Supreme Court has expanded eminent domain powers, by interpreting “public use” broadly, thus
it is likely these would be constitutional takings.121 The Supreme Court ruled, in Kelo v. City of
New London,122 that a city could take private property and redistribute it to private developers
without violating the public use requirement of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. 123 The Court
reasoned that “public use” also meant anything could fall under the purview of “public purpose,”
that being economic revitalization promoted the government’s interest in economic
development.124 Local governments have justified flipping the urban demographic using Kelo, for
example New York City revitalized Harlem and Brooklyn using Kelo’s very principle.125 Kelo
has led to displacement in these instances where the original residents lost their housing to those
who would be able to pay more money for the new-and-improved in the same location.126
Retreating may seem, to coastal residents, as the most unjust form of policy. 127 Many
littoral residents may not want to leave their homes due to strong ties to their communities,
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children, schools, and personal attachments. Moving may no longer be a choice as sea levels rise
and it turns into the only option for safety 128, but forcing residents out without planning for an
adjustment on the mainland only worsens the effects of climate gentrification.

ACCOMMODATION POLICIES
Americans believe that people and businesses most at risk from sea level rise should foot
the bill for recovery efforts and not the general public or government. 129 Despite this belief,
accommodation policies continue to aid those along the coasts. One of the most problematic
accommodation policies is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 130 Enacted in 1968 as
a response to the private insurance market refusing to offer flood insurance, the NFIP aimed to
insure residents in the zones found on the program’s flood maps, showing which areas were high
risk or low risk.131 The NFIP is managed through FEMA, and participation in NFIP is not required
in communities.132 The insurance is only available to those whose communities participate in the
program by agreeing to enact certain measures to help mitigate flood risk; however, the program
does not require communities to restrict or forbid building in flood-prone areas.133 Flood-prone
areas are found on maps drawn by FEMA. 134 The maps are not updated regularly, and as sea level
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rises and flooding occurs more frequently and regularly, the maps cannot keep up with the modern
change in flood areas or predicted changes in flood-prone zones.135
NFIP is heavily subsidized by taxpayers and $25 billion in debt; it has been operating at
a loss for over a decade. 136 Some homeowners take advantage of the program by rebuilding the
same $100,000 home over nearly two decades of recurring flood damage and superstorm beatings,
using over a million dollars of the insurance’s resources.137 This ability to repeatedly rebuild
storm-destroyed homes in the same storm-threatened location is “not only uneconomical and
inefficient but also could significantly interfere with a local government’s [climate change
strategy.]”138 Despite the interference, some local governments favor accommodation policies
because compensating victims and promising for a future change is easier than encouraging people
to leave.139
Furthermore, as time continues, rates will rise in order to insure the properties repeatedly
affected by climate change and the higher the rates rise, the less likely homeowners will choose to
stay.140 Mortgages on properties not protected by insurance on the coast are deemed unsellable. 141
This in turn reduces the liquidity of the homes and causes higher interest rates on mortgages. 142
Due to the requirement to have flood insurance; the rise in premiums seemingly every year due to
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Congress’s proposals; and some policies requiring mitigation, like flood proofing, the cost of
homeownership on the coast becomes nearly impossible to afford, thereby favoring the wealthy.143
Topical to this discussion would be the wildfires occurring in California in November of
2018.144 These fires destroyed homes and took lives, however, homes and lives were saved among
those of the richest population within Malibu and Paradise through private firefighters and access
to quick getaways.145 While these fires are outside the scope of this article, it is important to note
that in all aspects of climate change, those who can afford to avoid the risks and protect what’s
theirs, do, and those who cannot afford to, lose.

HOW CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES INFLUENCE CLIMATE
GENTRIFICATION
Each of the climate change policies discussed above are short term solutions for a longterm problem. Protection policies, while a robust solution for landowners along the coast, are
costly measures borne by the taxpayers. These policies could aggravate homeowners, like the
Karans, and force them to flee the area into the unprepared higher elevation. Furthermore, a
homeowner may have an extra 20 years added to the life of their property, but eventually the sea
will engulf their property and they will be forced out. Protection policies, unaccompanied by a
land use regulation or other solutions for those already living in the higher elevated areas, will only
be delaying the inevitable.
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Retreat policies exacerbate gentrification and displacement. Overregulating municipalities
will either drive their property owners out due to frustration or force them out as soon as possible
with a prohibition of use ordinance. These policies will create an influx of property owners fleeing
to the mainland, possibly inundating a community with a population for which it was not intended
to provide.
Accommodation policies push low-income families out of the coastal properties as rates
begin to rise and living near water becomes impossible to afford.146 While wealthier families will
be able to bear the rising costs along the coast, an influx of low-income families will continue to
strain communities on the mainland that do not have enough low-income resources already.

PART IV
THE SOLUTION
Amortization of nonconforming use, an aspect of land use regulation, allows a prior
existing development with a legal use a set number of years to phase into non-use.147 Amortization
provisions have a presumption of validity 148 and the land owner must ordinarily show that the
period is too short to be able to recover the money invested in the property were he to challenge
the ordinance.149 Amortization accompanied by a fair amount of time, is accepted as “obviating
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the need for just compensation.” 150 To justify amortization periods, courts weigh the benefit to
the public against the loss to the landowner.151
Cities should enact amortization periods for coastal properties, determinant on a reasonable
amount of time, in order to give the property owner enjoyment of their property with notice of why
they will be retreating within that reasonable amount of time. A reasonable time would be
determined by the courts 152, but in order to satisfy the just compensation principle, a reasonable
amount of time could be proposed to be 50 years, or about the length of a generation. 153 By
eliminating the coastal zone as a residential zone, the municipalities would be restricting the use
of property for any reasonable purpose, and could be challenged on the Takings Clause with this
kind of regulatory taking.154 However, the court has concluded that the elimination of use within
a reasonable amount of time does not amount to the taking of property, and municipalities would
likely succeed based on nuisance principles anyway.155 For consideration, the property may very
well be taken by the sea within a half century anyway.
In addition to amortizing zones, cities should consider enacting a transferable development
rights (TDRs) program in order to prepare higher elevated areas for the eventual population influx.
TDR programs are typically implemented in historic locations or farm lands, or to protect national
parks.156 TDRs function by restricting development on a parcel of land that would otherwise have
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development potential, known as the sending parcel, and allowing properties in the receiving area
to exceed their zoning density through purchasing the development rights of the sending parcel. 157
TDRs allow the transfer of density from sites that would be identified as having a preservation
status, and giving those undeveloped rights to allow for density beyond what is already built in the
receiving area.158
In 2008, New Jersey enacted its own TDR program, the Highlands Water Protection and
Planning Act (“Highlands Act”) after the State’s legislature determined the Highlands area, which
provided drinking water and farmlands to New Jersey, was being lost to development and suburban
sprawl.159 The Highlands Act serves to protect nearly 800,000 acres from harm by creating two
areas within the region: a preservation area (sending zone) where development is strictly regulated
and the development potential can be transferred, and a planning area (receiving zone), in which
development is encouraged through the purchase of the sent parcels to build at a greater density
than permitted.160 A landowner who owned 93 acres within the preservation area challenged the
Highlands Act.161 He claimed the legislation resulted in a taking of his property. 162 The court
disagreed, stating that municipalities within the Highlands area had no obligation to accept the
designation as receiving zones, and property owners who had obtained TDR credits had no
assurance of being offered a particular price for them.163 Therefore, the program couldn’t be an
unconstitutional taking because the Act was a voluntary, market-driven scheme that resulted in
payment from property developers. 164
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In addition to TDR programs constitutionality, TDR programs are often successful, as illustrated
in New York City:
A landowner who constructs a building that uses less than the entire amount of
development rights available on the site, or whose site is subject to a rezoning that provides
for additional density beyond what is already built, retains the use of the additional
development rights. Buildings in New York City that have been designated as historic
landmarks, such as churches and, famously, Grand Central Terminal, may not be permitted
to alter the external appearance of their building. The owners of such buildings may,
however, transfer the unused development potential of their site to adjacent or nearby
parcels through a certification process. After the excess development potential has been
transferred, the landowner retains title to his parcel, as well as the right to use it, provided
the transferred development rights are not utilized. The owners of Grand Central Terminal
can continue to operate as a train station once the building's excess development rights are
sold, and agricultural land under a farmland preservation TDR program may continue to
be farmed.165

In a coastal context, the beachfront owner would sell their development rights, but still maintain
their property under the requirement that the use would not involve any construction of new or
permanent structures.166
The best solution to combat displacement on the mainland from coastal expatriates is to
combine an inclusionary zoning principle with climate change policies, similar to the TDR
program established above. Inclusionary zoning itself is constitutional, in fact, required by some
states.167 Municipalities could require a tax on or percentage of an accommodation policy, like
flood insurance, to be placed in a trust to assist lower income families who will be inevitably
affected by the influx of people moving to the mainland. The same proposition would stand for
every protection policy – a new dune or seawall – a percentage of the cost to construct would be
placed in the trust.

Accommodation, protection, and retreat policies each present unique

challenges – no one of these policies is the perfect solution. But intertwined with a program that
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prepares for the challenges the rising sea level will bring, this solution would allow the property
owner to continue living along the coast without being pushed out by retreat policies and would
allow for development and inclusive programs within the mainland and urban areas to prevent
displacement of underrepresented populations.

CONCLUSION
This note put forth the position that sea level rise and municipal legislation could place
both coastal property owners and the urban population in a difficult situation.

Climate

gentrification is the process by which those who escape coastal living will gentrify areas inland
and cause displacement of long-term residents. This can happen either through property on the
mainland becoming unaffordable due to its high-elevated resiliency or that maintaining coastal
property will become too expensive and force out those who cannot afford it into the mainland.
Any of the common climate change policies that protect the coastal property owners, force them
to retreat from the coast, or accommodating future living along the coast all only exacerbate
climate gentrification.
This note argued that in order to protect the gentrifying areas and not harm the beachfront
property owners in the process, a Transferable Development Rights program should be instated to
incentivize development in the urban areas and not take property from the beachfront owners. This
note also argued that an amortization period may also be a proper form of retreat for those on the
coasts as flooding and sea level rise will eventually overtake their property. These solutions best
protect property owners without subjecting municipalities to takings challenges.
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